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School Choice Programs Do Not Render
Participant Private Schools "State Actors"
Vanessa Ann Countrymant
In June 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Cleveland school choice program.' In the aftermath of
that decision, it is likely that more cities and school districts will
implement their own school choice programs. 2 Though much
prior scholarship has defended these programs,3 scholars should
now address the secondary legal issues that the implementation
of these programs will raise.
Under the typical school choice program, the state identifies
sub-standard public schools (as measured by test scores and
other factors) and offers a small percentage of students the op-
portunity to receive a voucher.4 This voucher represents a por-
tion of the cost to the state of educating that student in the sub-
standard school for one year.5 The student then may choose to
t A.B. 2000, Columbia College, Columbia University; M.Phil. 2002, Oxford Univer-
sity; J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Chicago.
1 Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 652 (2002) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of Cleveland's School Choice Program).
2 See, for example, Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program, Colo Rev Stat §
22-56-101 (West 2003). This program was halted when the state court struck down the
law. Tamar Lewin, Colorado's New Voucher Law is Struck Down in State Court, NY
Times A24 (Dec 4, 2003). Congress has proposed a school choice program for the District
of Columbia. See Spenser Hsu, House Approves Vouchers for D.C.; U.S. Would Pay Tui-
tion for 1,300 Students, Wash Post Al (Sept 6, 2003).
3 See, for example, Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Consti-
tution, and Civil Society (Brookings Inst 1999); Stephen D. Sugarman and Frank R.
Kemerer, eds, School Choice and Social Controversy: Politics, Policy and Law (Brookings
Inst 1999); James E. Ryan and Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 Yale L J 2043 (2002); Robert Holland and Dan Soifer, How School Choice Benefits the
Urban Poor, 45 Howard L J 337 (2001); Michael McConnell, Governments, Families, and
Power: A Defense of Educational Choice, 31 Conn L Rev 847 (1999).
4 Milton Friedman initially advanced this idea of school choice and the term
voucher, though his proposal was not limited in scope to poorer schools or students. See
Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle over School Choice 3-4 (Cato Inst
2003).
- See, for example, Cleveland Pilot Scholarship Program, Ohio Rev Code §§
3317.03(I)(1), 3317.08(A)(1) (West 2003). Under this program, students may receive
scholarships of 75 or 90 percent of the tuition of private schools (depending upon the
family's income), which are not permitted to charge more than $2,500 per year for tuition.
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apply that voucher to another, better-performing public school,
or to a private school participating in the program.6 Most stu-
dents who choose private schools through these programs attend
religious schools. 7
When students attend private schools through publicly-
funded school choice programs, the private sphere blurs with the
public sphere. Because of their ties to the state, private schools
that participate in school choice programs potentially could be
regarded as state actors. 8 Because school choice programs are
new, no litigation has yet arisen over the question of whether a
private school in a school choice program can be considered a
state actor.9
This is not an abstract question. Rather, the identification of
a private school as a state actor has real consequences for school
Participating public schools would receive that scholarship, as well as the "average daily
membership" expenditure. When the number of applicants exceeds the number of avail-
able spaces, the students are chosen by lottery. See also Florida's Opportunity Scholar-
ship Program, Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(1) (West 2003) ("The Legislature shall make avail-
able opportunity scholarships in order to give parents the opportunity for their children
to attend a public school that is performing satisfactorily or to attend an eligible private
school when the parent chooses to apply the equivalent of the public education funds
generated by his or her child to the cost of tuition in the eligible private school.").
6 Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(1) (West 2003).
7 See, for example, the Cleveland program, in which 77 percent of the students in
the program enrolled in religious schools. Dan Murphy, F. Howard Nelson, and Bella
Rosenberg, The Cleveland Voucher Program, available online at
<http://www.aft.org/researchlreports/clev/lawdoes.htm#Who> (visited May 3, 2004).
8 See Laura T. Rahe, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and the Private Choice Doctrine, 50
Cleve St L Rev 221, 249-50 (2003) (discussing the possibility that a school accepting
voucher money could be considered a state actor); Ira Bloom, The New Parental Rights
Challenge to School Control: Has the Supreme Court Mandated School Choice?, 32 J L &
Educ 139, 167, n 139 (2003) (noting that the receipt of public funding may make voucher
schools vulnerable to being declared state actors). In a more general context, one scholar
examined the general problems of governmental action through private actors, pointing to
school choice programs as one example. She concluded that the state action tests are
largely inapplicable to these private exercises of governmental power and the emphasis
should be upon structures that will ensure constitutional accountability. See Gillian E.
Meltzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum L Rev 1367, 1500 (2003). This Comment
seeks to examine more closely the legal analysis that courts are likely to undertake in the
examination of school choice programs.
9 There is widespread hostility to school choice programs, making subsequent litiga-
tion on collateral issues likely. Opponents include the National Education Association
and the American Civil Liberties Union. See Institute for Justice Current School Choice
Litigation Information, available online at <http://www.ij.orgcases/> (visited May 3,
2004). See also Holmes v Bush, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla Cir Ct) (holding that Florida's
Opportunity Scholarship Program violates a state constitutional provision by taking
money from public treasury to indirectly aid sectarian institutions). The Florida Oppor-
tunity Scholarship Program continues to function while awaiting appeal. Litigation is
also ongoing in Maine. See Anderson v Town of Durham, 2003 WL 21386768 (Me) (dis-
missing a claim against Durham that the tuition reimbursement violated the Anderson's
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
choice programs. For example, the procedural protections that a
student is due before she is disciplined, and consequently
whether a student is owed protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, depends on whether the school is a state actor.10 If
a student admitted to a school choice program is disciplined and
ultimately expelled from the better school, the student has lost
something more than just a place at a school. That student has
lost an opportunity to escape the public school system that had
not served her. The impulse in these situations may be to at-
tempt to undo the loss and somehow prevent the school from ex-
pelling the student. Thus, litigation over whether a private
school participant can be considered a state actor may arise in
the context of the procedural rights of disciplined students.
This Comment argues that courts should not distinguish be-
tween private schools that participate in school choice programs
and those that do not by finding participant private schools to be
state actors. Part I provides background on the differences in
procedural protections in the public and private school settings.
Part II analyzes current Supreme Court jurisprudence on state
action. Part III argues that a private school's participation in
school choice programs should not render it a state actor for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV examines the par-
ticular problem presented by any attempt to declare religious
schools state actors, thus supporting the argument in Part III.
Part V points out that the absence of a finding of state action will
not leave the students in school choice programs without proce-
dural protections. The low level of procedure typically imposed in
the private school setting provides sufficient protection.
I. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOL CHILDREN
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
protects against deprivations of life or a recognized liberty or
property interest without appropriate procedural safeguards.1 2
Those procedural safeguards typically involve notice of the possi-
10 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 637 (1943)
(holding that students in public schools are owed Fourteenth Amendment protections).
11 "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
12 See Cleveland Board of Education v Loudermill, 470 US 532, 541 (1985) (discuss-
ing the Due Process Clause).
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ble deprivation, 13 as well as a hearing to challenge the action. 14
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees these protections, but
only for actions by the state. 5 Actions by private individuals do
not fall under the scope of the Due Process Clause.' 6 Private
schools are private actors: they may act as they choose, and the
Fourteenth Amendment will offer no protection to those affected
by a private organization's actions.' 7 Therefore, to understand
what is at stake for the private school students in school choice
programs, it is helpful to have some background about the proce-
dural rights of both public and private school students.
A. Due Process Rights of Public School Students
The Supreme Court consistently has held that public high
school students enjoy Fourteenth Amendment protections, as
public schools are creatures of the state.'i For example, in Goss v
Lopez,' 9 the Supreme Court considered the due process rights of
public school students who had been suspended for ten days or
less without a hearing. 20 Because Ohio established a public
school system and compelled attendance, the Court determined
that the students possessed a property interest in their public
education.21 The Due Process Clause protected that property in-
terest, and thus, the state could not deprive the students of their
13 Mullane v Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314-15 (1949) ("An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is ac-
corded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.").
14 Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976):
15 NCAA v Tarkanian, 488 US 179, 191 (1988).
16 See Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 722 (1961) (stating that
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to "private conduct abridging
individual rights").
17 Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 US 345, 349 (1974) ("[This Court]
affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between dep-
rivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, how-
ever discriminatory or wrongful, against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no
shield.") (citations omitted).
18 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 637 (1943)
("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against
the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.").
19 419 US 565 (1975).
20 Id.
21 Id at 574.
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entitlement to a public education without the minimum protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause.22
The Supreme Court briefly described the "minimum proce-
dures" required by the Due Process Clause and determined that
the students "must be given some kind of notice and afforded
some kind of hearing."23 The Court stated that its decision did
not require a formal procedure, merely an "informal give-and-
take between student and disciplinarian."24 The Court limited its
holding, however, to short suspensions not exceeding ten days.25
In dicta, the Court suggested that it might require more formal
procedures when the punishment exceeded a ten-day suspen-
sion.26
Lower courts have determined that this "give-and-take" re-
quires that the student be given oral and written notice of the
charges, and if he denies the charges, an opportunity to hear the
evidence against him and the opportunity to refute it.27 These
notice requirements are not stringent; frequently they require
simply that the student have notice of the date, time, place, and
circumstances of the alleged violation.28 The opportunity to be
heard does not necessitate a formal hearing, and often, courts
will find that a student who has admitted her guilt or had an
opportunity to explain to the school her side of the story is enti-
tled to no formal hearing.29
22 Id.
23 Goss, 419 US at 579.
24 Id at 584. Interpreting this language, lower courts have determined that this "give-
and-take" requires that the school give the student oral and written notice of the charges,
and if the student denies the charges, an opportunity to hear the evidence against him or
her and the opportunity to refute it. See, for example, Atcitty v Board of Education of San
Juan County School District, 967 P2d 1261, 1264 (Utah 1998) ("We conclude that appel-
lant received Goss' procedural due process requirements. . . .The informal setting in
which the principal provided appellant an opportunity to discuss or refute the allegations
was all the procedural due process owed to appellant.").
25 Goss, 419 US at 581.
26 Id at 584.
27 Atcitty, 967 P2d at 1264. See also Larry Bartlett and James McCullagh, Exclusion
from the Education Process in the Public Schools: What Process is Now Due, 1993 BYU
Educ & L J 1 (discussing caselaw involving procedural due process at elementary and
secondary public schools, with particular emphasis upon the concerns of the Powell dis-
sent in Goss).
28 See, for example, Walker v Bradley, 320 NW2d 900, 900-01 (Neb 1982) (discussing
notice requirements).
29 Boster v Philpot, 645 F Supp 798, 800 (D Kan 1986) (holding that where a student
has admitted his guilt there is no right to a hearing); Montoya v Sanger Unified School
District, 502 F Supp 209, 213 (Cal 1980) (holding that if the student admits all relevant
facts then an informal hearing is not necessary). But see Strickland v Inlow, 519 F2d 744,
746 (8th Cir 1975) (holding that students have the right to present their views even if
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B. Procedural Protections for Private School Students
The constitutional concerns of Goss do not arise in the pri-
vate school context because private schools are considered pri-
vate actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Accord-
ingly, since the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state ac-
tors,31 private schools have the absolute right to control their
own decisionmaking procedures. 32 In Flint v St Augustine High
School 33, for example, a Louisiana court of appeals overturned
the trial court's determination that a private-school student, ex-
pelled for a second violation of a no-smoking rule, had not re-
ceived due process. 34 The court declared that "private institutions
* . .have a near absolute right and power to control their own
internal disciplinary procedure .... If there is color of due proc-
ess-that is enough."35
The decision in Goss also addressed the nature of what a
student loses when she is expelled or suspended from public edu-
cation.36 The impulse to provide due process protection to public
school students flows not only from a formalist application of the
notion that state action triggers Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion, but also from an understanding that the students have lost
something difficult to replace.37
The concern of the Court over the loss of an education does
not apply in the private school context because if a private school
were to expel a student, that child may simply attend the public
school that serves her district. The state system of public school-
ing exists as an option for those students who have lost their pri-
vate school education.38 In contrast, a student who is expelled
from her public school does not have a corresponding fall-back
guilt has been admitted).
30 See Flint v St Augustine High School, 323 So2d 229, 234 (La 1976) (holding that
private schools are private actors).
31 Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 US 345, 349 (1974) (noting the difference
between public and private action for purposes of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
32 See Hernandez v Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A2d 365, 370 (NJ 1999) (hold-
ing that a private school is held to the constitutional requirements of due process only if
the private school has "substantial involvement with the state").
33 323 So2d 229 (1976).
34 Id at 234.
35 Id at 234-35.
36 Goss, 419 US at 576.
37 Id.
38 See Jenkins v Leininger, 659 NE2d 1366, 1376 (111 1995) (noting the existence of
alternatives to public schooling).
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school; if the parents cannot or will not pay for private schooling,
finding schooling becomes difficult, if not impossible.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that private high
school students are entitled to less procedural protection than
that afforded both public high school students and private uni-
versity students because of this ability to fall back on the public
school system.39 As it is more difficult simply to transfer univer-
sities, the procedural rights of private university students must
be protected. 40 In contrast, the private high school student may
simply transfer to a public school, the court reasoned, without
significant loss. 41 Thus, the court held that a private high school
must only adhere to its own published guidelines and follow a
fundamentally fair procedure.42
This Comment assumes the propriety of these determina-
tions regarding the procedural rights of private school students.
The question of students' procedural rights in general has been
amply debated in the literature. 43 Rather, this Comment ulti-
mately concludes that because private schools in school choice
programs are not state actors, they should enjoy the lower proce-
dural standard even after they choose to participate in school
choice programs.
II. TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PRIVATE ACTOR IS
CONSIDERED A STATE ACTOR UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
A clear line divides courts' approaches to students' disputes
with public versus private schools. Public schools are state actors
and face heightened procedural requirements under the Four-
39 Hernandez, 730 A2d at 371.
40 Id at 375.
41 Id.
42 Id at 376. For a general discussion, see Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct
at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for "Fundamental Fairness" in Discipli-
nary Proceedings, 42 BC L Rev 653 (2001) (analyzing the methods courts have used to
determine which procedures are fundamentally fair).
43 See, for example, Bartlett and McCullagh, 1993 BYU Educ & L J at 1 (cited in note
27) (surveying the procedural due process decisions in the twenty years after Goss);
Christopher D. Pelliccioni, Is Intent Required? Zero Tolerance, Scienter, and the Substan-
tive Due Process Rights of Students, 53 Case W Res L Rev 977 (2003) (examining the zero
tolerance requirement in many public schools to determine whether it violates the due
process protections of students); Brooke Grona, School Discipline: What Process is Due?
What Process is Deserved?, 27 Am J Crim L 233 (2000) (examining the problem of violence
in schools and the procedural reactions to it by legislatures).
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teenth Amendment." In contrast, private schools are private ac-
tors, and as such, do not face these requirements. 45 The Supreme
Court has recognized, however, certain circumstances in which
private conduct may be deemed state action for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.46 In particular, the Supreme Court
has articulated two key tests for determining whether a private
actor can become a state actor for the purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment analysis: the delegation of a public function test and
the entwinement test.47
A. Delegation of a Public Function Test
The delegation of a public function test examines whether a
private actor has assumed responsibility for an action which is
typically undertaken by the government. The case most relevant
to analysis of school choice programs is Rendell-Baker v Kohn.48
In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether a private
school that received over 90 percent of its funding from public
funds could be declared a state actor. 49 At issue in Rendell-Baker
was the discharge of a teacher who the school had hired with the
state's approval and paid with state-provided funds.50 The
teacher argued that the school had discharged her without due
process of law.5 '
The Court ultimately found that the private school was not a
state actor.5 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court asked
"whether the school's action in discharging [the teacher] can
fairly be seen as state action."53 The Court's answer turned on its
44 Goss, 419 US at 573.
45 See Wisch v Sanford School, Inc, 420 F Supp 1310, 1313 (Del 1976).
46 See Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531
US 288 (2001) (finding state action by a privately created athletic association).
4' The Court has articulated other tests as well. For example, the Court will consider
whether the state action results from the state's "coercive power," or when the private
actor is controlled by an "agency of the state." Brentwood, 531 US at 296. Fundamentally,
all of these tests seek, through a fact-intensive analysis, to determine whether the private
action can fairly be considered that of the state. Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, 419
US 345, 351 (1974). This Comment focuses on the delegation of a public function and
entwinement tests because these are the tests applied in relevant lower court cases, and
lend themselves most clearly to the analysis of school choice programs.
48 457 US 830 (1982).
49 Id at 842 (noting that the school's purpose was to educate maladjusted students
who could not remain in the public school system).
50 Id at 834.
51 Id at 838.
52 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 831.
53 Id at 838.
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consideration of four factors: the receipt of public funds, the regu-
lation by the state, the performance of a public function, and the
nature of the relationship between the state and the school.54
The Court held that none of these factors sufficed to warrant a
finding of state action.55 First, the receipt of public funds did not
transform the acts of some aspects of the institution into state
actions. 56 Second, the extensive regulation of some aspects of the
school did not change the nature of the discharge from private to
public, as the decision at issue was not linked to the state's regu-
lation.57 Third, the Court declared that the mere performance of
a "public function" did not sufficiently transform a private actor
into a state actor.58 Fourth, the Court rejected the idea of a
"symbiotic relationship" between the State and the school 59 be-
cause the state received no financial profit from the school.60
Several years later, in West v Atkins,61 the Court further ex-
plored the public function test, reaching the opposite conclusion
from that in Rendell-Baker. In this case, the Court determined
that a doctor under contract to the state to provide medical care
for inmates, acted "under color of state law" within the meaning
of 42 USC § 1983 ("Section 1983").62 The Court refused to draw a
distinction between a physician's being on the state payroll ver-
sus being under contract.63 This refusal seems to run counter to
the language of Rendell-Baker, which assumed that the state
must exclusively provide the function in order for the private
54 Id at 840.
55 Id at 840-43.
56 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 840.
57 Id at 841.
58 Id at 842 ("[TIhe question is whether the function performed has been traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State.").
59 Id.
60 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842.
61 487 US 42 (1988).
62 Id at 45 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.") Section 1983 creates a cause of action against the
government for the deprivation of civil rights. See 42 USC § 1983 (2000). If a private
actor's conduct satisfies the state-action requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment that
conduct also is an "action under color of state law" and can then be attacked under Sec-
tion 1983. See also Lugar v Edmondson Oil Company, 457 US 922, 928-35 (1982) (stating
the reciprocal nature of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
rights protected by Section 1983).
63 West, 487 US at 54.
525] 533
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
actor to be considered a state actor.64 In general, the state is not
the exclusive provider of medical care. Many private doctors offer
medical services to a large segment of the population; here, how-
ever, the Court found that the doctor engaged in state action.
Instead of emphasizing the function that the private actor
was serving, the Court in West examined the relationship be-
tween the three relevant parties: the doctor, the prisoner, and
the state.65 The Court noted that "[tihe State bore an affirmative
obligation to provide adequate medical care to West; the State
delegated that function to respondent Atkins; and respondent
voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract."66 The Court
was concerned that the prisoner had no option other than to ac-
cept the medical care from the contracted doctor; to the prisoner,
the lack of choice meant that it made no difference whether the
doctor was under contract or an actual employee of the prison.
This lack of choice makes the holding in West consistent with
that in Rendell-Baker. The Court in Rendell-Baker examined the
exclusivity requirement from the point of view of the service pro-
vided.67 If the state is the only purveyor of the function at issue,
it cannot avoid responsibility for that service by allowing a pri-
vate actor to accomplish it.68 The Court in West was concerned
with the point of view of the individual receiving the services.
The state provided all services to the inmate, including medical
services, without providing another option for obtaining these
services.6 9 While it is true that the state does not traditionally
and exclusively provide medical care to the larger populace, the
state is the only source of medical treatment for prison inmates.
In these limited circumstances, the delegated function of medical
care is the exclusive province of the state.
In the same year as West, the Court again analyzed the no-
tion of delegating governmental authority to a private actor. In
NCAA v Tarkanian,70 a basketball coach was sanctioned by the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas ("UNLV"), a state actor, under
rules promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
64 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842.
65 West, 487 US at 56.
66 Id.
67 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842.
68 Id.
69 West, 487 US at 44.
70 488 US 179 (1988).
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tion ("NCAA"). 71 It was the NCAA, rather than UNLV, however
that controlled the disciplinary proceedings.7 2 Thus, this case
presented a mirror image of the traditional state-action situa-
tion. The question presented here, however, was whether the fact
that UNLV complied with the rules promulgated by the NCAA
transformed the NCAA into a state actor.73 The Court inquired
"whether the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced
the power of the harm-causing individual actor."74 Distinguishing
West, the Court noted that though a state certainly may delegate
authority to a private party, and thereby make that party a state
actor, this situation was not controlling.7 5 The NCAA could not
"be regarded as an agent of [UNLVI for purposes of that proceed-
ing."76 The University had not controlled the actual decision by
the NCAA to discipline the coach.7 7 This case suggests that a
crucial element of this doctrine lies in the state's control of the
action at issue. The University did not guide or dictate the disci-
plinary decision litigated in this case.7 8
These three cases together suggest that the Court examines
two primary elements under the delegation of a public function
test. First, the Court considers whether the state has delegated
an exclusive state function to a private actor. In Rendell-Baker,
the Court found that while the state does provide education, it is
not the only supplier of education in the United States.7 9 In West,
however, the inmate could receive medical treatment only
through the state.80 Second, the Court examines the particular
proceeding in question and determines whether the delegation
applied to that particular action. In Tarkanian, for example, the
Court focused on the fact that UNLV did not control the actions
of the NCAA, and thus the NCAA could not fairly be perceived as
an "agent" of the State.81
71 Id at 186-87.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Tarkanian, 488 US at 192.
75 Id at 195.
76 Id at 196 (emphasis added).
77 Id.
78 Tarkanian, 488 US at 196.
79 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842.
80 West, 487 US at 44.
81 Tarkanian, 488 US at 196.
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B. The Entwinement Test
The entwinement test differs from the delegation of a public
function test in the focus of its examination. Rather than seeking
to isolate the service provided by the state or the relationship
between the state and the recipient of the service, the entwine-
ment test examines the contacts between the state and the pri-
vate actor in aggregation.8 2
The entwinement test was articulated in Brentwood v Ten-
nessee Secondary School Athletic Association.8 3 In this case, an
interscholastic athletic association had penalized Brentwood
Academy for violating the association's regulations pertaining to
recruitment.8 4 The Court found that this regulatory enforcement
action constituted state action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 5 The Court examined the particulars of the supervision
and internal workings of the athletic association and determined
that public institutions and public officials influenced the asso-
ciation to such an extent as to render the entire body a state ac-
tor: "[tihe nominally private character of the Association is over-
borne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and
public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no
substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional
standards to it."86
The exact contours of this test remain undefined, but fun-
damentally the test considers whether the involvement of the
state with the internal workings of the private actor is so perva-
sive as to convert the actions of the private actor into state ac-
tion. In applying the entwinement test, the Court noted that "no
one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board
for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances abso-
lutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason
against attributing activity to the government."87 In Brentwood,
the Court focused upon the fact that public officials dominated
the decisionmaking body of the association.8 8 The opinion seemed
82 Brentwood, 531 US at 303 ("When, therefore, the relevant facts show pervasive
entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity, the implication of state action is
not affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom large under a different test.").
83 531 US at 288 (2001).
84 Id at 293.
85 Id at 297.
86 Id at 298.




rooted in the idea that the association's decision itself became
entwined with the state apparatus because public officials had
participated in the decisionmaking process.8 9
C. Logiodice v Trustees of Maine Central Institute9°: An Exam-
ple of the Application of Both Tests
Both the entwinement test and the delegation of a public
function test remain widely used in the lower courts and in par-
ticular have been used in cases analogous to the school choice
program situation.91 Analysis proceeds under both tests because
they examine different aspects of the school's relationship with
the state, and thus, a finding of state action under one test does
not necessitate a similar finding under the other.92 As the public
function test turns on a limited number of factors, if the control
of an exclusive governmental function is missing then this test
will not be met. The entwinement test differs from the public
function test in that the entwinement test does not require that
the state directly control the private actor's action in order to
justify a finding of state action. The entwinement test seeks only
to determine whether the state has permeated the apparatus of
the private actor. At a certain point, the involvement of the state
with the private actor becomes so pervasive that the private ac-
tor may fairly be considered a state actor.93 The entwinement
test determines whether, in the aggregate, there are a sufficient
number of state contacts to identify a state actor. 94 Thus, a court
can apply both test to determine whether a particular act
amounts to state action.
A recent First Circuit case, Logiodice, demonstrates analysis
of state action under both tests.95 The court in Logiodice held
that a student who attended a private school funded by the local
public school district was not entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
89 Id.
90 296 F3d 22 (1st Cir 2002), cert denied 537 US 1107 (2003).
91 See, for example, Wisch, 420 F Supp at 1313-14 (applying versions of the "en-
twinement" and the "public function" tests, though predating Brentwood and Rendell-
Baker).
92 Brentwood, 531 US at 303.
93 Id at 293.
94 Id at 303 ("'Coercion' and 'encouragement' are like 'entwinement' in referring to
kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private action as public in-
stead. Facts that address any of these criteria are significant, but no one criterion must
necessarily be applied.").
95 Logiodice, 296 F3d 22.
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protections when he was expelled from the private school.96 The
student's school district did not have a public school,97 and ac-
cordingly, any student who wished could attend the local private
school through public funding.98 The court applied both the dele-
gation of a public function test and the entwinement test by ana-
lyzing whether the private school had performed a traditional
state function and whether it was so entwined with the govern-
ment as to warrant a finding of state action.99
Addressing the public function test, the First Circuit deter-
mined that in order to constitute state action the private party
must perform a function that is traditionally and exclusively re-
served to the government, such as holding elections or adminis-
tering town governance. 100 The court then found that education
is not a function exclusively reserved to the state.10 1 Citing
Rendell-Baker for the exclusivity requirement of the public func-
tion test, the court noted that prior courts have "declined to de-
scribe private schools as performing an exclusive public func-
tion."l0 2
The court did point out that in all of the cases it cited, an
employee of the school, rather than a student, brought the suit.
The court noted that it might have been easier to find state ac-
tion in the previous cases if the relationship between the possible
state actor and the claimant was changed. 0 3 In other words, if
the plaintiff had been a student, the claim of state action might
have been stronger. While the court did not discuss its precise
reasoning, its concern may have arisen because of the specific
facts of Logiodice. A disciplinary proceeding affecting a student
seems more tied to the purpose of state regulation than does an
employment decision. The state creates public schools and regu-
lates them for the purpose of educating the students, not for the
employment of teachers. The court, however, ultimately ex-
pressed disquiet with the notion of identifying a state actor dif-
ferently depending upon the identity of the individual, bringing
the suit, and ultimately discarded this consideration as a basis
96 Id at 24.
97 Id.
98 Id at 24.
99 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 26.
100 Id.
101 Id, citing Pierce v Society of the Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925).
102 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 27, citing Robert S v Stetson School, Inc, 256 F3d 159, 165-66
(3d Cir 2001) and Johnson v Pinkerton Academy, 861 F2d 335, 338 (lst Cir 1988).
103 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 27.
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for distinguishing Rendell-Baker.10 4 Rather, the court followed
the plain language of that decision, noting that schooling is not
an exclusive state function and, thus, state action could not be
found on that basis. 10 5
The court, however, noted as an aside that West might be the
most apposite case, suggesting that in that case the Supreme
Court did not rely entirely on the public function doctrine.10 6
Rather, the Court focused on the fact that the doctor had fulfilled
a constitutionally protected right of the inmate to adequate
medical care. 10 7 The court concluded that the student in Logio-
dice did not have a constitutional right to education, thus mak-
ing West inapposite. 08
Though state action could not be found under the stringent
public function test, the court continued its analysis and applied
the entwinement test. 0 9 In discussing this test, the court distin-
guished Brentwood on the grounds that in the instant case, pri-
vate trustees ran the private school."10 Though the private school
received funding from the local school district, the state did not
interfere in the disciplinary proceedings of the school."' The
court noted that as the state had financial control over the
school, it easily could have dictated disciplinary procedures as
well; because it did not, the court concluded that the private
school alone controlled disciplinary decisions."12 The contacts
with the state did not rise to such a level as to transform the pri-
vate school into a state actor.
In commenting upon its own decision not to find state action,
the court reflected the concerns articulated in Goss about the
nature of the student's loss:" 3 the "threat of wrongful expulsion
from the local school of last resort (at least for those who cannot
pay) is the heart of the impulse to expand the state action doc-
trine to reach this case."114 Ultimately, however, the court shied
away from imposing constitutional standards upon privately
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id at 29.
107 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 29.
108 Id.
109 Id at 27.
110 Id at 27.
111 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 28.
112 Id at 27-28.
113 Goss, 419 US at 576.
114 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 29-30.
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governed institutions. 115 The court implicitly weighed the burden
upon the student against the institutional burdens on the private
school.116 While the court acknowledged that the student did not
receive the due process protection he would have received under
Goss had he attended public school (more formal procedures), the
court did not believe that the student had suffered a total denial
of due process rights. 117 The school gave the student and his par-
ents notice of the charges, and as there was no dispute over the
facts, the school did not choose to give the student an opportunity
to respond."18
III. PRIVATE SCHOOLS PARTICIPATING IN SCHOOL CHOICE
PROGRAMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STATE ACTORS
To understand why private schools participating in school
choice programs should not be considered state actors, one must
first understand how private schools differ from public schools in
ways relevant to this analysis. Proponents of school choice pro-
grams point out that these programs offer the benefits of private
schools to children in the lowest-quality public schools. 119 Private
schools set their own curricula, and control their own hiring,
class size, and disciplinary proceedings. 120 These freedoms allow
the private schools to tailor their programs to the individual stu-
dents, and to ensure control not only over the program, but over
the participants in it, as well. Public schools, limited by state-
imposed regulations, do not enjoy these freedoms.
If the participant private schools were declared state actors,
they would lose their decisionmaking autonomy.121 This not only
detracts from the benefits of the school choice program, but it
also impacts those parents who did not send their children to the
school because of the school choice program. Parents choose to
115 Id.
116 Id at 30.
117 Id.
118 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 30.
119 See Bolick, Voucher Wars at 15 (cited in note 4).
120 See Blount v Department of Educational and Cultural Services, 551 A2d 1377,
1383-84 (Maine 1988) (noting the autonomy of private schools).
121 See Asociacion de Educacion Privada de Puerto Rico v Echevarria Vargas, 289 F
Supp 2d 1, 4 (Puerto Rico 2003) ("[Tlhe state may not institute unreasonable regulations
which are so pervasive and all encompassing that they destroy the autonomy of private
schools.") (citations omitted); New Life Baptist Church Academy v Town of East Long-
meadow, 885 F2d 940, 945 (1st Cir 1989) (noting that state regulation of a private school
must not be so pervasive as to effectively eradicate the private school's autonomy).
540 [2004:
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
send their children to a particular school based on certain fac-
tors, and the state's imposition of further requirements upon the
school impacts parents' private choices. 122
The analysis by the First Circuit in Logiodice is a template
for the application of the delegation of the public function and
entwinement tests in the private school setting. The facts in that
case are analogous to school choice programs because in both
situations, the state funds students to attend a local private
school in place of a public school.123 The principles set forth in
Logiodice, however, do not capture all aspects of state involve-
ment with private school participants in school choice programs
that could arguably transform these schools into state actors.
One could argue that private schools in school choice pro-
grams become private state actors for two reasons. First, the pri-
vate school fulfills a public function by standing in the place of
the state actor, the public school. The state has delegated a pub-
lic function to the private school, thus the private school should
be treated like a public actor. Second, the private school has a
variety of contacts with the state, including through public fund-
ing and various state-imposed regulations, 124 which may combine
to transform the quality of its acts into those of the state.
But ultimately, neither of those arguments can succeed. Al-
though there are elements of the school choice program that
seem to suggest that participatory private schools are state ac-
122 Classifying a private school as a state actor raises the specter of unequal treatment
within a school. If only certain students receive public funding, should only those stu-
dents receive higher due process protections? It seems problematic that a private school
might be deemed a state actor with regards to only a certain segment of its student body.
The court in Logiodice discussed a related idea: "[Rendell-Bakerl involved claims to due
process protection made by teachers and not students; our own decisions in both cases
held out the possibility that students might have a better claim." Logiodice, 296 F3d at
27. The court then noted that "[wihether state actor status should depend on who is suing
is debatable." Id. A distinction can be drawn based on whether the relevant class of per-
sons received the services of the private institution. Thus, a participatory private school
could be a state actor with respect to its students and not to its teachers (the distinction
turning on the function provided). This reasoning does not suggest, however, that a school
may be a state actor with respect to only a portion of the population: the school provides
the same services to all the students, regardless of whether they attend through the
school choice program. Furthermore, if the state contacts are sufficient to elevate the
private school to public actor status, then they will do so relative to the entire student
body, not merely those particular students who attend with state funding.
123 See, for example, the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program, Ohio Rev Code Ann
§§ 3313.978(1)-(2) (West 2003).
124 See, for example, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Wis Stat Ann § 119.23
(West 2003) (requiring private schools to be subject to finance accounting standards, and
the monitoring of the school by the superintendent).
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tors, ultimately they are insufficient to warrant a finding of state
action.
A. The Delegation of a Public Function Test Does Not Apply in
School Choice Settings
The Court in Rendell-Baker unequivocally asserted that a
finding of state action under the delegation of a public function
test depends on "whether the function performed has been tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."125 That case con-
cerned a private school that received funding from the state and
offered an alternative to public schooling for certain students.126
The facts are analogous to those in a school choice setting and
thus, Rendell-Baker strongly suggests that private schools in
school choice programs should not be considered state actors.
This conclusion is echoed in Logiodice, when the First Circuit
echoed that standard by tersely rejecting the argument that pub-
lic schooling was an exclusive state prerogative: "[o]bviously,
education is not and never has been a function reserved to the
state."127
It could be argued, however, that West would control any de-
termination of state action in the school choice setting since the
Court there "did not base its decision on the public function doc-
trine," but rather focused on the fact that "the state had dele-
gated to a private actor a duty it was affirmatively obligated to
provide." 28 In West, if the state denied an inmate medical atten-
tion, the individual would have no other options, and thereby the
denial would violate his constitutionally protected right to medi-
cal care while incarcerated. The parallel argument would be that
the school choice program develops around the premise that the
student cannot receive an adequate education from the public
school and, due to financial constraints, cannot otherwise attend
another school. 29 While it may be too dramatic to say that the
125 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842 (internal citations omitted).
126 See Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 842 ("There can be no doubt that the education of
maladjusted high school students is a public function, but that is only the beginning of
the inquiry. Chapter 766 of the Massachusetts Acts of 1972 demonstrates that the State
intends to provide services for such students at public expense. That legislative policy
choice in no way makes these services the exclusive province of the State .... That a
private entity performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts state
action.").
127 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 26.
128 Id at 40 (Lipez dissenting).
129 See, for example, Florida's Opportunity Scholarship Program, Fla Stat Ann
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student is "trapped" in a failing educational system just as an
inmate is locked in prison, the state provides, through the me-
dium of the school choice program, the education it is affirma-
tively obligated to offer.130
In contrast to the constitutional protections offered to in-
mates, the Court has not recognized a federal constitutional right
to education. 131 But while no federal constitutional right to edu-
cation exists, a state constitution can create such a right by cre-
ating educational requirements for the government. 132 The dis-
sent in Logiodice noted that "as surely as West had a right under
federal law to medical services, students in Maine have a right
under its constitution to an education."133 It could be argued,
therefore, that West is controlling in school choice situations, and
thus, the participating private schools should be deemed state
actors. 134
§1002.38(1) ("The Legislature finds that the State Constitution requires the state to pro-
vide a uniform, safe, secure, efficient, and high-quality system which allows the opportu-
nity to obtain a high-quality education. The Legislature further finds that a student
should not be compelled, against the wishes of the student's parent, to remain in a school
found by the state to be failing for 2 years in a 4-year period.").
130 Some state constitutions require an "adequate" education. See, for example, Fla
Const Art 9, § 1 (West 2003) ("Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient,
safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality
education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and
other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."); NY Const Art XI, § 1
("The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free com-
mon schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated."); Ohio Const Art VI,
§ 2 ("The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with
the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system
of common schools throughout the State."); Wyo Const Art VII, § 9 ("The legislature shall
make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the income arising from the
general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public
schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state, between the ages of
six and twenty-one years, free of charge.").
131 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 35 (1973) ("Educa-
tion, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
132 See, for example, NY Const Art XI, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for the main-
tenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated."); NJ Const Art VIII, § 4, P 1 ("The Legislature shall provide for
the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for
the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen.");
Ohio Rev Code Ann §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (West 2003) (directing local authorities to
provide a free education and requiring attendance). See also Daniel Pollack and David
Schnall, Expelling and Suspending Students: An American and Jewish Legal Perspective,
9 New Eng J Intl & Comp L 334 (2003) (discussing the notion of fundamental and non-
fundamental rights inrelation to how states determine their own educational policies).
133 Logiodice, 296 F3d at 40.
134 Even under the federal Constitution, it could be suggested that there is some sort
of right to a minimal education which cannot be denied to a certain group of students. See
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A crucial distinction, however, exists between West and a
school choice program, and indeed, between a voucher school and
the school at issue in Logiodice. In a school choice situation, if
the student is expelled from the private school, the student sim-
ply would return to her original public school. While that option
may not appeal to the student, it will not deprive the student of
an education. As one court pointed out, the loss of a private edu-
cation simply requires the student to transfer to a public
school. 135 This loss is not as significant as the total deprivation of
education, which results from expulsion from a public school.
136
The presence of choice distinguishes the school choice pro-
grams from the situations in the public school setting. The prem-
ise of these school choice programs lies in the free and independ-
ent choices of the parents of the students. 37 In West, the inmate
received treatment from a doctor under contract, and had no
choice whether to receive the medical treatment from that doc-
tor. 38 While a parent may not wish to return her child to the
public school system, she cannot deny that after expulsion the
public school system remains an option. Expulsion from a private
school does not leave the student without educational options-
the local public school remains open to her.
Rodriguez, 411 US at 25 n 60 ("If elementary and secondary education were made avail-
able by the State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there
would be a clearly defined class of 'poor' people--definable in terms of their inability to
pay the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education.
... [The State] has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide an education to those
who can afford it. It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for
all children."); Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 221 (1982) ("[Education] is [not] merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.
Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and lasting im-
pact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction .... In sum, education
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.").
13' Hernandez v Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A2d 365, 375 (NJ 1999).
136 Id at 372.
137 Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 652 (2002) ("Because the program ensured
that parents were the ones to select [the schools] ... the circuit between government and
religion was broken.").
138 West, 487 US at 54.
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B. The State's Regulation and Funding of School Choice Pro-
grams Do Not Transform Participant Private Schools into
State Actors
Under Brentwood, simple entwinement principles could dic-
tate that school choice programs should be held accountable as
state actors. 139 The argument under Brentwood would be that the
presence of state regulation and public funding together, di-
vorced from any consideration of the public function doctrine, can
suffice to create entwinement and therefore a finding of state
action. However, in school choice programs, neither the state
funding nor the regulation on the private schools alone are suffi-
cient for a finding of state action. Furthermore, the Court in
Brentwood invoked the notion of state control over the decision
at issue in the case.140 Neither the funding nor the regulation
suggests state control over the school's functioning.
1. State funding of school choice programs is insufficient to
justify a finding of state action.
The fact that the private school participating in the school
choice program receives public funds is not dispositive of whether
the school is a state actor. The Court in Rendell-Baker explicitly
held that the "school's receipt of public funds does not make the
discharge decisions acts of the state."'4 ' Discussing Rendell-
Baker, the Court in West noted that "the fact that the private
entities received state funding and were subject to state regula-
tion did not, without more, convert their conduct into state ac-
tion."142
The Third Circuit, in Robert S v Stetson School, Inc'143 un-
derlined that the receipt of state funds alone does not transform
a private actor into a state actor.'4 While the court in Logiodice
focused upon state control of the school's action, the court in
Robert S explicitly focused upon the transfer of state money.' 45
139 See Brentwood, 531 US at 297-98.
140 Id at 295 ("[Sltate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close
nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself.") (internal quotations and citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
141 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 840.
142 West, 487 US at 52 n 10.
143 256 F3d 159 (3d Cir 2001).
144 Id.
145 Id at 164-65.
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The court determined that a private school, specializing in the
education of juvenile sex offenders, many of whom were placed in
the school through state agencies, was not a state actor, and thus
not subject to Section 1983 claims. 146 Following Rendell-Baker,
the court observed that the receipt of government funds is not
determinative of whether state action exists, and though the
state had a contractual relationship with the private school, the
requirements did not "compel or even influence the conduct.., of
the staff that [the student] challenged."1 47 The Third Circuit here
made explicit the connection between money and control: though
the state granted the school money, that money did not control
the particular incident. 48
2.The state exercises insufficient control over private schools'
decisions to warrant a finding of state action.
A state's regulation of a private school does not automati-
cally trigger a finding of state action. As the Third Circuit in
Robert S noted, state-dictated requirements for participation in a
program are not sufficient to make a private entity a state ac-
tor. 49 The Supreme Court also has declared that "the mere fact
that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself
convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment .... [n]or does the fact that the regulation is
extensive and detailed. " 150
Previous cases on state action also have focused on state
control over the disputed private action. As the Court noted in
West, "the private party's challenged decisions could satisfy the
state-action requirement if they were made on the basis of some
rule of decision for which the State is responsible."' 51 In Brent-
146 Id at 167-68.
147 Robert S, 256 F3d at 165 (internal citations omitted).
148 State courts have also addressed these issues, applying versions of the Brentwood
entwinement test. See, for example, Penny v Kalamazoo Christian High School Associa-
tion, 210 NW2d 893 (Mich App 1973) (finding no state action when a parochial school
refused to admit the plaintiffs daughter; though the school had state established curricu-
lum requirements, teacher qualification standards and record requirements, these con-
tacts did not implicate the school's admissions decisions, nor did the school serve an ex-
clusive state function); Oefelein v Monsignor Farrell High School, 353 NYS2d 674 (NY
1974) (determining that the expulsion of a student was not state action, though the state
administered regents' exams, classified the property as tax exempt, and dictated the use
of secular text books provided by the state).
149 Robert S, 256 F3d at 159.
150 Jackson, 419 US at 350. See also Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 841.
151 West, 487 US at 51 n 10. See also Perkins v Londonderry Basketball Club, 196 F3d
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wood, the Court articulated the threshold question of whether
there was a "close nexus between the state and the challenged
action."15 2 In other cases, the Court focused on whether the chal-
lenged action could fairly be called state action. 153 Thus, if the
state regulations through school choice programs rose to the level
of controlling the actions of the private school, the private school
might be found to be a state actor.
In the case of school choice programs, however, the discipli-
nary actions fall solely within the purview of the private school
and its administrators. 154 Because of this, the essential element
of control over the challenged action is missing. Under Florida's
"Opportunity Scholarship Program," a private school desiring
admittance to the voucher program must "adhere to the tenants
of its published disciplinary procedures prior to the expulsion of
any opportunity scholarship student." 55 Neither the Milwaukee
"Parental Choice Program" nor the Cleveland "Scholarship and
13 (1st Cir 1999) (applying the "nexus test" to determine that a privately run youth bas-
ketball club was not a state actor). The basketball club in Perkins did not permit a player
to participate in a tournament because of her gender. Id at 16. The court emphasized that
their inquiry was focused on "the connection between the State and the challenged con-
duct, not the broader relationship between the State and the private entity," and went so
far as to note that even if the State had conferred "monopoly status" on the private entity,
the courts must still require a "snug relationship" between that grant of power and the
challenged conduct. Id at 19-20.
152 Brentwood, 531 US at 295.
153 See Tarkanian, 488 US at 196 ("[The NCAA] cannot be regarded as an agent of
UNLV for purposes of that proceeding.") (emphasis added); Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 837
(noting that the decision to discharge was not compelled or even influenced by state regu-
lation).
154 The organic statutes for school choice programs do not address on the internal
disciplinary requirements for the private school participants. Even those state statutes
which directly address these participant private school's disciplinary proceedings note
that the school needs only adhere to its own procedures. See, for example, Florida's Op-
portunity Scholarship Program, Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(k) (West 2003).
155 Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(k) (West 2003). But see Moose Lodge No 107 v Irvis, 407
US 163, 176 (1972) (finding state action where state agency regulations affirmatively
required the private actor to adhere to all provisions of its constitution and by-laws). The
Moose Lodge had discriminatory by-laws governing the service of non-Caucasian guests.
Moose Lodge, 407 US at 165. The Court reasoned that the power of the State, through
this provision, stood behind the Lodge's decision to enforce the discriminatory policies. Id
at 178. The state placed its power behind the club's discrimination on the basis of race. Id.
This situation, though, is distinguishable from that in the school choice programs. First,
it is highly unlikely that any private school admitted to the program would have encoded
discriminatory laws into its stated policies. Second, the Florida statute is a procedural
mechanism, rather than a substantive policy-it requires only adherence to "procedures"
rather than placing the state's weight behind any particular standards. And the further
provision which demands that the student "comply fully with the school's code of conduct"
is also distinguishable; it simply codifies the understanding that in attending the private
school, the student is subject to its policies, not those of the public school which the stu-
dent would have attended. See Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(k) (West 2003).
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Tutoring Program" have any state-mandated provisions which
touch on school discipline.156 In the Milwaukee and Cleveland
programs the statute does dictate financial accountability stan-
dards. 157 In Florida and Milwaukee, both programs have re-
quired, as a condition of religious schools' participation, these
schools not to compel any student attending through a school
choice program to attend or participate in any religious activity,
or to profess particular beliefs. 158
While these individual state provisions do not affect the
functioning of a school, they do provide standards for schools'
admission to the voucher program, and prevent the school from
affirmatively requiring certain behaviors from the students ad-
mitted through the school choice program. Even in the case of
the Florida and Milwaukee programs, which effectively prevent
the schools from disciplining school choice students for refusal to
participate in religious activities, these provisions merely carve
out a realm of non-interference by the school. Even these stat-
utes leave the school's disciplinary proceedings to the judgment
of the school administrators. These statutes do not rise to the
level of controlling the particularities of the disciplinary proceed-
ings of the school that the Supreme Court has found constitutes
state action.
IV. THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY RELIGIOUS
SCHOOL PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
The Court in Brentwood acknowledged that under the en-
twinement test a finding of state action may be forestalled by
countervailing reasons.'5 9 "Even facts that suffice to show public
action (or, standing alone, would require such a finding) may be
outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding pub-
lic accountability in the circumstances."160 These values include
the autonomy of the private schools.' 6' But furthermore, a find-
156 See Wis Stat Ann § 119.23 (West 2003); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313.975 (West
2003).
157 Wis Stat Ann § 119.23 (West 2003); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313.975 (West 2003).
158 Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(j) (West 2003); Wis Stat Ann § 119.23(7)(c) (West 2003).
159 Brentwood, 521 US at 295-96.
160 Id at 303.
161 The private schools in question have a right to function without governmental
interference. See Bright v Isenbarger, 314 F Supp 1382, 1390 (Ind 1970) ("[T]he type of
'private' conduct--operation of private schools-challenged under the Fourteenth




ing of state action in the school choice setting potentially impli-
cates constitutional values of another sort.
The majority of private schools participating in school choice
programs are religious in nature. 162 A finding that these schools
are state actors presents two interrelated problems. First, such a
finding would contravene Supreme Court precedent holding that
there cannot be intrusion by the state into the province of the
church.163 Second, state actors are subject to higher due process
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. As decided in
Zelman v Simmons-Harris,16 school choice programs are prem-
ised on the notion that there is no direct control or connection
between the state and a religious institution. 65 To declare a pa-
rochial school to be a state actor, and then require these high
levels of due process and governmental oversight of these proce-
dural protections, would undermine a premise of these programs,
the separation of church and state.
A. Dlaikan v Roodbeen166: A Court's Refusal to Review a
Religious School's Decision
To counter a potential intrusion by the state into the inter-
nal functioning of an institution connected with a church, reli-
gious schools could argue that these heightened procedural re-
quirements would contravene the Free Exercise Clause. 67 For
example, the school could argue that religious decisions-here,
disciplinary proceedings-are not properly reviewable by the
162 See, for example, Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L Rev
917, 922-23 (2003) (noting that the majority of participating private schools in the Cleve-
land school choice program are religious).
163 See Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 16 (1947) ("[T]he
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation
between Church and State."). See also Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971); Grossner v
Trustees of Columbia Unversity, 287 F Supp 535, 549 n 19 (NY 1968) (rejecting the argu-
ment that all private schools perform a public function as such a finding would render
'the very idea of a parochial school... unthinkable").
164 636 US 639 (2002).
165 Id at 652 (noting that the school choice program did not violate the Establishment
Clause because the "circuit between government and religion was broken").
166 522 NW2d 719 (Mich App 1994).
167 See generally, Bonnie Daboll, Note, School-Choice Legislation: Constitutional
Limitations on State Regulation of Participating Parochial Schools After Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 55 Fla L Rev 711, 714 (2003) (noting that religious schools might fear that
excessive state regulation of schools participating in school choice programs will violate
their free exercise rights, and citing as an example the concern of the Milwaukee Arch-
diocese over the possibility that its diocesan schools would be regulated by the state.)
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court. 16 8 A difference in level of review would create awkward
dichotomies between religious and non-religious schools in the
school choice programs. While religious schools could argue that
they should be free of judicial review, non-religious schools would
not have that ability.
An example of a court's refusal to review a parochial school's
internal decisionmaking is Dlaikan. A Michigan court of appeals
refused to review the decision of a parochial school not to admit
two students.16 9
When the claim involves the provision of the very services
(or as here refusal to provide these services) for which the
organization enjoys First Amendment protection, then
any claimed contract for such services likely involves its
ecclesiastical policies, outside the purview of civil law. In
this regard there can be no distinction between a church
providing a liturgical service in its sanctuary and provid-
ing education imbued with its religious doctrine in its pa-
rochial school. 70
The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
because in doing so, it would have to examine the religious doc-
trine of the church, thereby implicating the First Amendment
rights of the religious institution. 171
This attitude creates a presumption in favor of the discipli-
nary decisions of religious schools, and frees them from the over-
sight given other non-religious private schools.172 The dissenting
opinion in Dlaikan illuminates these concerns, focusing upon the
rule that civil courts may "assert jurisdiction only over disputes
involving property rights which can be resolved by application of
civil law."1 73 Judge Taylor, in this dissent, rejected what he per-
ceived to be an "irrebutable presumption" in favor of religious
institutions, and declared that the court could properly review
168 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 713 (1976) (not-
ing the existence of the "general rule that religious controversies are not the proper sub-
ject of civil court inquiry").
169 Dlaikan, 533 NW2d at 720.
170 Id.
171 Id at 593.
172 See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens concurring) (noting
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 "provide[s] the Church with a legal
weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain").
173 Dlaikan, 522 NW2d at 722 (Taylor dissenting) (quotations and citations omitted).
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the decision to exclude these students, which sounds in both
property and contract law.174
B. Review of Religious Schools' Decisions Does Not Violate
Their Religious Freedom
Ultimately, this blanket argument against all judicial review
of disciplinary proceedings must fail.175 Issues surrounding a re-
ligious school's decision to discipline a student according to the
school's own stated procedures do not implicate First Amend-
ment questions. 76 This is true both because of the nature of the
possible conflicts that will arise between a student and her
school and due to the statutory provisions which carve out reli-
gious exemptions for those students who attend religious schools
on school choice programs. 77 Finding parochial schools to be
state actors is not necessary to preserve judicial review of their
decisions to discipline students.
Caselaw suggests that procedural review of a religious or-
ganization's decision is acceptable and the court in Dlaikan
reached the wrong decision. First, that case is an outlier, and
courts dealing with parochial schools' disciplinary decisions have
found those decisions to be properly reviewable. 78 Second, the
cases which illustrate a refusal to review religious organizations'
decisions are concerned with judicial interference with doctrinal
questions. These types of questions, which implicate "matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, cus-
174 Id at 720.
175 I do not address any other claims that the religious schools might bring against
state regulations, as this is outside the scope of my Comment; rather, I focus on the idea
of judicial review, in keeping with the overarching emphasis on judicial review of the
disciplinary proceedings and procedural requirements of private schools.
176 See New Life Baptist Church Academy v Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F2d 940,
944 (1st Cir 1989) (holding that the state may reasonably regulate private secular educa-
tion, including the secular education offered by religious schools).
177 See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(k) (West 2003) ("[Participating private
schools must] agree not to compel any student attending the private school on an oppor-
tunity scholarship to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship."); Wis Stat
Ann § 119.23(7)(c) (West 2003) ("A private school may not require a pupil attending the
private school under this section to participate in any religious activity if the pupil's par-
ent or guardian submits to the pupil's teacher or the private school's principal a written
request that the pupil be exempt from such activities.").
178 See, for example, Penny v Kalamazoo Christian High School Association, 210
NW2d 893 (Mich App 1973) (examining a religious school's admittance procedures); Oefe-
lein v Monsignor Farrell High School, 353 NYS2d 674, 674 (examining a religious school's
disciplinary decision).
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tom or law,"179 usually overlap with conflicts that arise within
the organization. For example, some cases deal with employees
involved in the doctrinal mission of a church. 80 In contrast, the
disciplining of a student does not involve doctrinal questions.
Furthermore, a student in a religious school is not party to any
internal church decisions on doctrine.
Significantly, most school choice programs statutorily re-
quire participating religious schools to allow school choice stu-
dents to avoid participating in the religious life of the school.' 8 '
As such, the state has carved out an area of the school's policies
which do not apply to the student. Thus, it is most likely that the
disciplinary proceedings will not involve doctrinal questions. 8 2
Additionally, at least one case has permitted procedural re-
view of the decision of a church to expel a member of the congre-
gation. In Baugh v Thomas,8 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that expulsion from a religious community can constitute a
serious emotional deprivation, and thus can trigger judicial re-
view to determine if the church adhered to its own stated poli-
cies. 8 4 The court determined that if the decision did not involve
religious doctrine, there was no compelling reason to review the
decisions of religious organizations differently from those of
other non-profit organizations. 8 5 The New Jersey court carefully
distinguished those Supreme Court cases that held that courts
179 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 US at 713 (1976).
180 See, for example, Bryce v Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F3d 648
(10th Cir 2002) (refusing review where plaintiffwas youth minister).
181 See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 1002.38(4)(j) (West 2003); Wis Stat Ann §
119.23(7)(c) (West 2003).
182 A harder question is presented in situations in which a student is disciplined for
contravening religious doctrine unintentionally. For example, an openly gay student in a
Christian school might be disciplined in some manner. While it is likely that the student
will have cognizable claims against the school, the constitutional claim of insufficient due
process should not be wielded to protect him or her. A finding of state action would
impermissibly bind the religious school to the apparatus of the state. See Karla D.
Shores, Christian School in Jupiter Sued for Expelling Gay Student, South Florida Sun-
Sentinal 1B (Oct 22, 2003).
183 265 A2d 675 (NJ 1970).
184 Id at 677.
185 Id. See also Taylor v Jackson, 50 App DC 381, 384 (1921) (holding that the decision
of a church to expel a member was void as the appellee lacked notice required by church
regulations and therefore was denied the opportunity to be heard). But see Kaufmann v
Sheehan, 707 F2d 355, 358 (8th Cir 1983) (refusing to review a deprivation of due process
claim since any review of whether "the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are...
'arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical
law supposedly requires the church adjudicatory to follow").
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could not review "ecclesiastical questions,"18 6 noting that the in-
stant decision simply reviewed procedure, rather than any inves-
tigation into spiritual matters or church doctrine. 8 7 Thus, under
the reasoning of Baugh,88 even if the proceedings involve doc-
trinal questions, the court may choose only to review the proce-
dural aspects of the proceedings.
V. Low-LEVEL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE
SCHOOLS' DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS PROVIDES A WORKABLE
AND CONSISTENT SOLUTION
The question of state action by private schools participating
in school choice programs may arise in the disciplinary setting.
The implication of a finding of state action would bind these pri-
vate schools to offering a high level of due process protection.
Furthermore, to find state action in the case of secular private
schools, but not in the case of religious private schools would cre-
ate a distinction between two classes of participant schools in
school choice programs. Such deference showed to religious
schools is unwise and, most likely, impermissible. 8 9
In Goss, the Supreme Court recognized that the state de-
prives a student of something important when that student loses
a public school education.' 90 In the situation of school choice, the
expulsion would deprive the child of the opportunity to attend a
higher quality school than the original public school offering.
While it does not reach the level of deprivation presented by a
public school expulsion, for in the case of expulsion from a pri-
vate school a back-up public school does remain, the removal of
the educational opportunity does deserve procedural protections.
It is not necessary, however, to hold private schools in school
choice programs-whether religious or not-to a lower standard
186 Presbyterian Church in the US v Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem Presbyterian
Church, 393 US 440, 445 (1969) (articulating this notion of "ecclesiastical questions").
187 Baugh, 265 A2d at 677. While this is the only case that addresses the procedural
review question squarely, the acceptability of review of religious school's decisions is
implicit in other cases. See, for example, Randolph v First Baptist Church of Lockland,
120 NE2d 485, 488 (Ohio 1954) (holding that the court may properly review a church's
decision to expel a member for adherence to its stated rules and regulations).
188 Baugh, 265 A2d at 677
189 City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens concurring) (concurring in
the judgment to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act on the grounds that
it creates an unconstitutional presumption for religious organizations).
190 Goss, 419 US at 576.
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than that of "fundamental fairness."191 The low levels of process
traditionally required by private school disciplinary proceedings
leave a school free to pursue its own policies for discipline, as
well as to offer some level of protection to the students who at-
tend. If one of the few students 192 admitted to a school choice
program-in other words, granted the opportunity to leave her
marginal school for a better one-is forced to leave for discipli-
nary reasons, she has lost an opportunity to get a better educa-
tion, to escape her failing school. But even absent a finding of
state action, these students will not be left without any protec-
tions. Applying the articulated standards of adherence to stated
policies 193 or fundamental fairness 194 keeps the school free from
unwarranted interference in the internal decisionmaking of the
school, maintaining the autonomy of the school, as well as the
possibility of the school choice program, and protects the student
from arbitrary decisions. 195
CONCLUSION
Under the delegation of a public function test and the en-
twinement test, private schools participating in school choice
programs should not be declared state actors. The state lacks the
requisite control over the actions of the school and the contacts
that do exist between the state and the school are insufficient to
transform the private actor into a state actor. That the majority
of private schools in these programs are religious supports this
argument against a finding of state action.
School choice programs are likely to remain an option for
struggling school districts,'196 offering a limited number of stu-
191 Hernandez v Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A2d 365, 373 (NJ 1999).
192 Very few students are ultimately admitted to the programs. For example, in Mil-
waukee, only 1450 spaces were provided in the program for academic year 1994-95. John
F. Witte, Achievement Effects of the Milwaukee Voucher Program, Discussion Paper Table
1 (American Economics Association Annual Meeting 1997), available online at
<http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/choice/aea97.html> (visited May 3, 2004).
193 See Christ the King Regional High School v Catholic High Schools Athletic Associa-
tion, 624 NYS2d 755, 756 (NY 1995) (recognizing that "private educational organizations
may to a large extent order their own affairs; but, at the very least, their conduct may not
be arbitrary or capricious or violative of the applicable constitutions, by-laws, rules or
regulations"); Bright v Isenbarger, 314 F Supp 1382 (ND Ind 1970).
194 See Hernandez, 730 A2d at 373.
195 The student may also bring other causes of action against the school. For example,
remedy for the student might be found in breach of implied contract. See Wisch v Sanford
School, Inc, 420 F Supp 1310, 1315 (Del 1976).
196 Bolick, Voucher Wars at 201 (cited at note 4).
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dents the opportunity to achieve a better education. These pro-
grams harness the autonomy and flexibility of private schools,
which limit class size, control the curricula, and discipline their
students as they see fit. To declare these participant private
schools state actors would curtail this autonomy and have severe
repercussions for the continued viability of school choice pro-
grams.
F:-E-&--]
